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[Crim. No. 5768. In Bank.

Nov. 29, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. CHARLES A. SIMON,
Respondent.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justi1i.cation for.-A search incident
to an arrest cannot be justified in the absence of "reasonable
cause" under Pen. Code, § 836, merely because it reveals that
defendant is in fact guilty of a felony.
[2a,2b] Id.-Justification for.-The search of defendant's person
at night may be justified only if he was committing or attempting to commit an offense in the officer's presence (Pen.
Code, § 836, subd. I), or if the officer had reasonable cause
to believe he had committed a felony. (Pen. Code, § 836,
subd. 5.)
[3] Id.-Time of Making.-A search is not unlawful merely because it precedes rather than follows the arrest, the important
considerations being whether the officer has reasonable cause
before the search to make an arrest and whether the search
and any seizures incident thereto are or are not more extensive
than would reasonably be justified as incident to an arrest.
[4] Id.-Justi1i.cation for.-The mere fact that defendant was
walking on a street with a 20-year-old friend who had a bottle
did not" constitute reasonable cause to believe that defendant
was committing or attempting to commit an offense in the
[1] See Ca1.Jur., Searches and Seizures § 2 et seq. j Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
Melt. Dig. References: [1-6, 8] Searches and Seizures, § 1;" [7]
Arrest, § 5.
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officer's presence by either aiding or abetting his friend in
committing a crime or contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, and hellce did not justify an officer making a search
of defendant's person.
Id.-Justification for.-The mere fact that an officer felt that
defendant and his 20-year-old friend did not have any lawful
business in a warehouse district at night did not indicatl'
that the officer had reasonable cause to believe that defendant
had committed a felony, and hence did not justify the officer
in making a search of defendant's person.
Id.-Justification for.-The mere fact that two persons walked
a few blocks in a warehouse district at night and then retraced their steps would not constitute reasonable cause to
believe either had committed a felony.
Arrest-Without Warrant.-There is nothing unreasonable in
an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night, and it is
possible that in some circumstances even a refusal to answer
would, in the light of other evidence, justify an arrest.
Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-Where an officer
first searched defendant and a8ked questions only after his
search uncovered an incriminating marijuana cigarette, and
wherp. there is nothing to indicate that had he confined him·
self to a reasonable inquiry he would have discovered anything
to confirm his suspicion that defendant had no lawful right to
be where he was, the search may not be justified on the
ground that the officer "didn't feel" that such person had
any lawful business there at night.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San
Diego County granting a motion to set aside an information.
John A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E.
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Appellant.
Oscar F. Irwin for Respondent.
A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J .-By information defendant was charged
with one count of possessing a llarcotic in violation of Health
and Safety Code, section 11500, a felony. His motion to
set the information aside (see Pen. Code, § 995) was granted
on the ground that all of the evidence against him, other
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than admissions, was obtained by an illegal search of his person in violation of his constitutional rights. The People appeal.
At about 10 :40 p. m. defendant, age 21, and a friend,
age 20, were observed walking on the sidewalk in a warehouse
district by a San Diego police patrolman who was walking
his beat. The officer testified that ' , Well, I observed [defendant] walking south on Seventh Avenue, from Island,
he went south to J Street, turned left on J, proceeded east
on J Street to the corner of Ninth and J, where he turned
around and followed the same course back to Seventh and
Island. " The officer then stopped defendant and his friend
and searched them both, and in one of defendant's pockets
he found a marijuana cigarette. Defendant told him that he
had bought it in Tijuana, but he did not acknowledge knowing
what it was. Defendant's friend had a bottle of liquor, and
the officer arrested them both. After he was taken to the
police station, dust and lint were collected from defendant's
pockets and analyzed, and particles of marijuana were found.
With respect to his reasons for the searches and arrests
the officer testified as follows: "I suspected [defendant]
of committing a crime. What crime Y Possession of alcoholic
beverages. Did you see him with an alcoholic beverage'
His partner had a bottle. Oh, his partner had one, did he!
I wanted to find out so I searched him. Did he have an
alcoholic beverage on him f I didn't find any. Why did you
assume that he had an alcoholic beverage on him, why would
you suspect that was a crime Y Because of his age. Did you .
ask him how old he was f Yes, I did. Before or after
you made the search of him f I searched his partner first
and he was twenty years old-- The partner was twenty
years old! Yes, sir. . . . After you searched his partner
then you searched this defendant! Yes, sir. . . . Did you
~k him his name and age, before you searched him' I never
asked him, they had J.D. cards. Did you look at the I.D.
cards! Yes, sir. How old did it show he was! Twenty-one,
I believe. Twenty-one' Yes, sir. . . . I assumed him to be
under twenty. • . . Didn't you say his J.D. card shows him
to be twenty-one! I searched him before I looked at his
I.D. card. Oh, you did, and you didn't try to ascertain his
age before you conducted the search, did you! No sir, he
looked younger than his partner. And the search was·.made
solely because of the fact that you thought he was [a] minor
in possession of alcoholic beverage T • • • Not solely for that
purpose. What other reason f Well, the area that the boys
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were found in, it is not a residential area and I didn't feel
that they had any lawful business down there. It was a
warehouse district and it was late at night."
The attorney general contends that the search in this case
was incidental to a lawful arrest and was therefore reasonable.
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the search preceded the arrest and was not incidental thereto and that in
any event the arrest was unlawful.
[1] In People v. Brown, ante, p. 640 [290 P.2d 528],
we held that a search incident to an arrest could not be
justified in the absence of "reasonable cause" under Penal
Code, section 836, merely because it revealed that defendant
was in fact guilty of a felony. [2a] Accordingly, the search
of defendant's person may be justified only if he was committing or attempting to commit an offense in the officer's
presence (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 1), or the officer had reasonable cause to believe he had committed a felony. (Pen. Code,
§ 836, subd. 5.) [3] In such circumstances, however, it has
been held that it is not significant whether the search precedes or follows the arrest. (State v. McDaniel, 115 Ore.
187 [237 P. 373, 376] ; State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224 [125
A. 636, 637-638] ; Ingle v. Oommonwealth, 204 Ky. 518 [264
S.W. 1088, 1090] ; Knight v. State, 171 Ark. 882 [286 S.W.
1013, lOH:-1015] ; see also Olark v. State, 78 Okla.Crim. 423
[149 P.2d 994, 997] ; State v. Rotolo, 39 Wyo. 181 [270 P.
665, 666-667].) Thus, if the officer is entitled to make an
arrest on the basis of information available to him before
he searches, and as an incident to that arrest is entitled to
make a reasonable search of the person arrested and the place
where he is arrested, there is nothing unreasonable in his
conduct if he makes the search before instead of after the arrest. In fact, if the person searched is innocent and the
search convinces the officer that his reasonable belief to the
contrary is erroneous, it is to the advantage of the person
searched not to be arrested. On the other hand, if he is
not innocent or the search does not establish his innocence,
the security of his person, house, papers, or effects suffers
no more from a search preceding his arrest than it would
from the same search following it. In either case the important considerations are whether the officer had reasonable
cause before the search to make an arrest and whether the
search and any seizures incident thereto were or were not
more extensive than would reasonably be justified as incident
to an arrest. (See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,
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60-64 [70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653].) We conclude, therefore,
that a search is not unlawful merely because it precedes rather
than follows the arrest.[2b] In the present case, however, there was no evidence
of anything apparent to the officer's senses before the arrest
and search that defendant was committing or attempting to
commit an offense in his presence (see People v. Brown, ante,
p. 640 [290 P.2d 528]), and it does not appear that the
officer had reasonable cause to believe he had committed a
felony. It is true that defendant's friend had a bottle, and
it may be assumed without deciding that the appearance of
the bottle and of defendant's friend were sufficient to justify the officer'8 concluding that the friend was committing
a misdemeanor in his presence. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662
[possession of alcoholic beverage by a minor on a public
street]; see Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Ca1.2d 315, 319-321
[239 P.2d 876].) [4] The mere fact, however, that defendant was walking on the street with a 20-year-old friend
who had a bottle did not constitute reasonable cause to believe
that defendant was committing or attempting to commit an
offense in the officer's presence by either aiding or abetting
his friend in committing a crime or contributing to the delinquency of a minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702; United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581. 592-594 [68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210] ;
see also Hernandez v. United States, 17 F.2d 373; Pearson v.
United States, 150 F.2d 219, 221; Morgan v. State, 197 Ind.
374 [151 N.E. 98, 100].)
[5] Similarly, there is no merit in the attorney general's
contention that the officer had reasonable cause to believe
that defendant had committed a felony. The officer's own
testimony does not indicate that he believed defendant guilty
·In most of the cases cited for a contrary rule (United States v. Swan,
15 F.2d 598, 599; RanieZe v. United States, 34 F.2d 877,880; Papani v.
United States, 84 F.2d 160, 164; United States v. McOunn, 40 F.2d 295,
296;United States v. Setaro. 37 F.2d 134, 136-137; United States v.
Sully, 56 F.Supp. 942, 943-944; United States v. Waller, 108 F.Supp.
450, 452-453), there were either other reasons for holding the search
unreasonable or the statement of the rule was dictum. Thus, in United
States v. Waller, supra, although the court stated that a search that
preceded an arrest could not be justified as incident thereto, it held
that defendant had consented to the search. In Raniele v. United
States, supra. the court was of the opinion that before the search the
officers had insufficient grounds for believing an offense was being ~om·
mitted in their presence (see also United States v. Setaro, supra), and
in United States v. Swan, supra, and United States v. McOunn, supra,
defendant was not present or discovered by the officers until after the
search was completed.
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of a felony; he merely felt that the boys did not have any
lawful business in a warehouse district at 10 :40 p. m.
[6] Moreover, the mere fact that two persons walked a few
blocks in a warehouse district at night and then retraced
their steps would not constitute reasonable cause to believe
either had committed a felony, even if the officer had entertained such a belief. (State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921 [190
P.2d 740, 747] ; People v. Henneman, 373 Ill. 603 [27 N.E.
2d 448, 449] ; People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610 [251 N.W. 788,
790, 92 A.L.R. 481]; see also llernandez v. United States
supra, 17 F.2d 373; Pearson v. United States, supra,
150 F.2d 219, 221; Morgan v. State, supra, 197 Ind. 374
[151 N.E. 98, 100].) This is not a case in which the officer
knew or reasonably believed that a felony had recently been
committed in the neighborhood (see Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.
App. 13, 15 (98 P. 43J), or in which a response to a reasonable inquiry elicited evidence that defendant may have been
guilty of a crime. (See Hughes v. Oreb, 36 Oal.2d 854, 858
(228 P.2d 550].) [7] There is, of course, nothing unreasonable in an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night
(Gisske v. Sanders, supra, 9 Oal.App. 13, 16-17; People v.
Exum, 382 Ill. 204 [47 N.E.2d 56, 60] ; People v. Henneman,
367 Ill. 151 [10 N.E.2d 649, 650]; United States v. Jankowski, 28 F.2d 800, 802; see also Morgan v. United States,
159 F.2d 85, 86-87; Kaiser v. United States, 60 F.2d 410,
412-413; Strogen v. United States, 60 F.2d 483; Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 178 [69 S.Ot. 1302, 93 L.Ed.
1879], Burton, J., concurring), and it is possible that in
some circumstances even a refusal to answer would, in the
light of other evidence, justify an arrest. (See Gisske v.
Sanders, supra, 9 Oal.App. 13, 17.) Even if it were conceded that in some circumstances an officer making such an
inquiry might be justified in running his hands over a
person's clothing to protect himself from an attack with a
hidden weapon, certainly a search so intensive as that made
here could not be so justified. [8] In the present case the officer
searched first and asked questions only after his search uncovered the incriminating cigarette, and there is nothing to
indicate that had he confined himself to a reasonable inquiry,
he would have discovered anything to confirm his suspicion
that defendant had no lawful right to be where he was.
Under these circumstances, to permit an officer to
justify a search on the ground that he "didn't feel" that
a person on the street at night had any lawful business there
would expose anyone to having his person searched by any
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suspicious officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions
were. Innocent people, going to or from evening jobs or
entertainment, or walking for e~rcise or enjoyment, would
suffer along with the occasional criminal who would be turned
up. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Jackson in a similar case,
"We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to necessity.
It is said that if such arrests and searches cannot be made,
law enforcement will be more difficult and uncertain. But
the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too
permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think
was a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some
criminals from punishment. Taking the law as it has been
given to us, this arrest and search were beyond the lawful
authority of those who executed them." (United States v.
Di Re, supra, 332 U.S. 581, 595.)
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J. pro tern.,· concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
28, 1955. McComb, J. pro tem.,· participated therein in place
of Edmonds, J. Shenk, J., and Spence, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

-Assigned b7 Ohairman of Judieial CounciL

